Bank One, Utah, National Association, fka Valley Bank and Trust Company, National Association v. Paul Herwit : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1995
Bank One, Utah, National Association, fka Valley
Bank and Trust Company, National Association v.
Paul Herwit : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Grant W. P. Morrison; Attorney for Appellant.
Arnold Richer; Mark E. Medcalf; Richer, Swan & Overholt; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Bank One v. Herwit, No. 950714 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6936
IN THE UTAH COl JR1 OF APPEA1 
Ou^cTNQ.^O'/H.. 
BANK ONE, UTAH, National 
Association, fka VALLEY BANK 
AND TRUST COMPANY, National 
Association, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
PAULHERWIT, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Appellate Court No. 950714-CA 
Priority No. /& 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PAULHERWIT 
On appeal from the Judgment of the Third 
Circuit Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Honorable Michael L. Hutchings, Circuit Judge 
Arnold Richer 
MarkE. Medcalf 
Richer, Swan, & Overholt, P.C. 
Attorneys for Appellee Bank One 
311 South State Street, Suite 280 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Grant W. P. Morrison 
Attorney for Appellant Paul 
Herwit 
1200 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
FILEi 
JAM 2 1996 
COURT OF APPEALS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES iii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 2 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS . . 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 5 
A. Nature of the Case . . . . . . . . 5 
B. Course of the Proceedings and the Disposition Below . . . 5 
C. Statement of Facts . . . . . . . . 5 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT 8 
I. BANK ONE HAS FAILED TO CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISH 
THE NONEXISTENCE OF ANY GENUINE ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACT, THUS RENDERING THE SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION OF THIS CASE INAPPROPRIATE . . . 8 
E. BANK ONE IS NOT ENTITLED TO ENFORCE THE $9000 
CHECK AGAINST HERWIT AS A MERE HOLDER OF THE 
INSTRUMENT 13 
l 
ARGUMENT (continued) Page 






 ^LE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Higginsv. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993) . 
Seinfeld v. Commeiua: bank & i rust ic ' 
3Dist. 1981) 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (1992 & Supp. 1995) 
Uniform Commercial Code 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-103 (Supp. 1995) . 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-301 (Supp. 1995) . 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-302 (Supp. 1995) . 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-305 (Supp. 1995) . 
Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-306 (Supp. 1995) . 
TREATISES 
. - J. White and Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 
(3d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1993) . . 
in 
m THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BANK ONE, UTAH, National 
Association, fka VALLEY BANK 
AND TRUST COMPANY, National 
Association, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
PAUL HERWIT, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 950714-CA 
Priority No. f£ 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PAUL HERWIT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant Paul Herwit brings this appeal from a decision by the Third Circuit Court of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, granting appellee Bank One's motion for summary judgment. This 
Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (1992 & Supp. 
1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue #1 
Did the circuit court err in concluding that Bank One was a person entitled to enforce a 
$9000 check presented to it for payment where genuine issues of material fact exist precluding the 
possibility of Bank One enforcing the check as a holder in due course? 
Issue #2 
Did the circuit court err in concluding that Bank One was a person entitled to enforce the 
check where appellant has raised several defenses negating Bank One's right to enforce it as a 
mere holder of the instrument? 
Standard of Review 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court must 'View the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." 
Higginsv. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231,233 (Utah 1993). "Summary judgment is 
appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Because entitlement to summary judgment is a question of law, no 
deference is due the trial court's determination of the issues presented. However, [this Court] may 
affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not 
relied on below." Id. at 235 (citations omitted). 
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The following statutory provisions are determinative in this appeal: 
Uniform Commercial Code, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-103 (Supp. 1995) (in part) (based on UCC 
§ 3-103): 
"Good faith" means honesty in fact and the observance of 
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing. 
Uniform Commercial Code, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-301 (Supp. 1995) (based on UCC § 3-
301): 
"Person entitled to enforce" an instrument means the holder of the 
instrument, a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the 
rights of a holder, or a person not in possession of the instrument 
who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to Section 70A-3-
309 or Subsection 70A-3-418(4). A person may be a person 
entitled to enforce the instrument even though he is not the owner 
of the instrument or is in wrongful possession of the instrument. 
Uniform Commercial Code, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-302(l) (Supp. 1995) (based on UCC § 3-
302): 
(1) Subject to Subsection (3) and Subsection 70A-3-106(4), "holder 
in due course" means the holder of an instrument if: 
(a) the instrument when issued or negotiated to the holder 
does not bear such apparent evidence of forgery or alteration 
or is not otherwise so irregular or incomplete as to call into 
question its authenticity; and 
(b) the holder took the instrument for value, in good faith, 
without notice that the instrument is overdue or has been 
dishonored or that there is an uncured default with respect to 
payment of another instrument issued as part of the same 
series, without notice that the instrument contains an 
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unauthorized signature or has been altered, without notice of 
any claim to the instrument described in Section 70A-3-306, 
and without notice that any party has a defense or claim in 
recoupment described in Subsection 70A-3-305(l). 
Uniform Commercial Code, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-305 (Supp. 1995) (in part) (based on UCC 
§ 3-305): 
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the right to enforce the 
obligation of a party to pay an instrument is subject to the following: 
* * * 
(b) a defense of the obligor stated in another section of this 
chapter or a defense of the obligor that would be available if 
the person entitled to enforce the instrument were enforcing 
a right to payment under simple contract; and 
(c) (I) a claim in recoupment of the obligor against the 
original payee of the instrument if the claim arose from the 
transaction that gave rise to the instrument; 
(ii) but the claim of the obligor may be asserted against a 
transferee of the instrument only to reduce the amount 
owing on the instrument at the time the action is brought. 
(2) The right of a holder in due course to enforce the obligation of a 
party to pay the instrument is subject to the defenses of the obligor 
stated in Subsection (l)(a), but is not subject to defenses of the 
obligor stated in Subsection (l)(b) or claims in recoupment stated in 
Subsection (l)(c) against a person other than the holder. 
Uniform Commercial Code, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-306 (Supp. 1995) (based on UCC § 3-
306): 
A person taking an instrument, other than a person having rights of 
a holder in due course, is subject to a claim of a property or 
possessory right in the instrument or its proceeds, including a claim 
to rescind a negotiation and to recover the instrument or its 
proceeds. A person having rights of a holder in due course takes 
free of the claim to the instrument. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from an order dated September 28, 1995 of the Third Circuit Court, Salt 
Lake County, the Honorable Michael L. Hutchings presiding, granting Bank One's motion for 
summary judgment. Judge Hutchings concluded that Bank One was entitled to enforce a check 
against appellant Paul Herwit ("Herwit") in the amount of $9000. Herwit challenges Bank One's 
efforts to enforce this check against him as either a holder or a holder in due course. 
B. Course of the Proceedings and the Disposition Below 
Bank One filed this action against Herwit on August 2,1995, and Herwit answered Bank 
One's complaint on August 11,1995. On August 23, 1995, Bank One filed a motion for 
summary judgment, which Herwit5 s trial counsel opposed with two affidavits. Bank One 
subsequently filed a reply memorandum on September 14,1995. On September 28,1995, Judge 
Michael L. Hutchings issued an order granting Bank One's motion for summary judgment. 
Without issuing any findings, Judge Hutchings concluded that Bank One was entitled to enforce a 
$9000 check against Herwit as a matter of law. Herwit timely appealed. 
C. Statement of Facts 
On or about May 19, 1995, Herwit drew check number 2526 on his account at First 
Security Bank for $9000. The check was made payable to Aristocrat Travel and Cruises 
("Aristocrat") and was meant to purchase ownership in the company. Herwit instructed Aristocrat 
to hold on to the check until Herwit had enough funds in his account to cover it. Aristocrat was 
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fully advised that the check would not clear until the closing on Herwit's condominium occurred. 
However, on May 25,1995, an Aristocrat employee presented the check to Bank One for 
payment. 
Upon deposit of the check, Bank One credited Aristocrat's account for $9000, but did not 
allow Aristocrat to immediately withdraw funds in the amount of the check. Bank One then sent 
the check along to First Security Bank ("First Security") for collection. On May 30, 1995, without 
awaiting word from First Security as to whether Herwit's check had cleared, Bank One allowed 
Aristocrat to make a withdrawal in the amount of the check. That very same day, First Security 
refused to accept Herwit's check and refused to remit payment thereon. First Security stamped 
the instrument "RTM" (refer to maker) and returned it due to insufficient funds. 
Rather than immediately debiting $9000 from Aristocrat's account, Bank One continued to 
credit the account in the amount of Herwit's check. Over the next two months, the branch 
manager at Bank One telephoned Capital Assets to inquire into whether there had been a closing 
yet on Herwit's condo. During this same time, the branch manager also phoned Herwit to ask 
about the closing. Herwit informed him that there had not yet been a closing and that he had no 
idea whether one would ever take place. 
Aristocrat subsequently became insolvent and filed for bankruptcy. As a result, Bank One 
proceeded to enforce its claim to payment on the $9000 check against Herwit. On August 23, 
1995, Bank One filed a motion for summary judgment with the circuit court. In support of its 
motion, Bank One contended that it was a holder in due course. Bank One also argued that if it 
was not a holder in due course, it was at least a holder of the check and was thus entitled to 
enforce it against Herwit. Bank One's motion was opposed by two affidavits. On September 28, 
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1995, the circuit court issued an order granting Bank One's motion for summary judgment. 
Herwit appeals from this order. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
When the facts are construed in the light most favorable to Herwit's position, at least two 
genuine issues of material fact exist which effectively preclude the summary disposition of this 
case. First, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Bank One was on notice that 
Herwit's check would be dishonored when it was deposited and when Bank One allowed the 
payee to make a withdrawal in the amount of the check. Second, a genuine issue of material fact 
exists as to whether Bank One's actions in handling Herwit's check satisfy the test of good faith. 
Since these issues remain unresolved, Bank One cannot properly enforce the $9000 check against 
Herwit as a holder in due course. 
Bank One's efforts to enforce the check against Herwit as a mere holder of the instrument 
stand on even weaker ground. As a plain vanilla holder of the check, Bank One is subject to the 
same defenses which Herwit can raise against the transferor of the check, Aristocrat. Herwit has 
articulated several defenses against Aristocrat which thus apply equally well against Bank One. 
These defenses effectively preclude Bank One from enforcing the instrument against Herwit. 
Consequently, Bank One is not entitled to enforce the instrument as either a holder or as a holder 
in due course. This Court should therefore reverse the circuit court's entry of summary judgment 
in Bank One's favor. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. BANK ONE HAS FAILED TO CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISH 
THE NONEXISTENCE OF ANY GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL 
FACT, THUS RENDERING THE SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
OF THIS CASE INAPPROPRIATE 
Senoii'i! <|ucNlionN iviiMin .is tu whether I tank ( )nc piopeily qualities as m person eniitlcil in 
enforce Herwit's $9000 check. In support of its motion for summary judgment, Bank One argued 
also argued that if it did 
not qualify as a holder in due course, it was at least a holder of the instrument and was therefore 
entitled to enforce it against Herwit. The circuit court, without issuing any findings, granted Bank 
One's motion for summary judgment. See Order of September 28,1995? at i . : the circuit 
court failed to issue any findings, if is not clear whether the court believed that Bank One was 
entitled 
however, genuine issues of material fact exist which effectively preclude the summary disposition 
First, Bank One's ability to enforce the $9000 check against Herwit as a holder in due 
course has not been conclusively established. In order to come within the protected status of a 
holder in due course, a party must first satisfy several conditions. These conditions are outlined in 
section 70A-3-302 of the Utah Code, which provides: 
"[H]older in due course" means the holder of an instrument if: (a) 
the instrument when issued or negotiated to the holder does not bear 
such apparent evidence of forgery or alteration or is not otherwise 
so irregular or incomplete as to call into question its authenticity; 
and (b) the holder took the instrument for value, in good faith, 
without notice that the instrument is overdue or has been dishonored 
. . . , without notice that the instrument contains an unauthorized 
signature or has been altered, without notice of any claim to the 
instrument described in Section 70A-3-306, and without notice that 
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any party has a defense or claim in recoupment described in Section 
70A-3-305(l). 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-302Q) (Supp. 1995) (emphasis added). Thus, a holder in due course is 
a holder of a negotiable instrument who took the instrument for value in good faith and "without 
notice that it was overdue or had been dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it on the 
part of any person." James J. White and Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 14-2, 
at 615 (1988). 
Because holders in due course take their instruments free of almost all claims and defenses 
that may arise, Bank One would prefer to be a holder in due course rather than just a plain vanilla 
holder of the instrument. However, when the facts are construed in the light most favorable to 
Herwit's position, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Bank One was on notice 
that Herwit's check would not be honored. A genuine issue of material fact also exists as to 
whether Bank One's actions satisfy the test of "good faith." As the party seeking the protected 
status of a holder in due course, Bank One carries the burden of establishing that it has satisfied 
both of these conditions. Seinfeld v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co.. 405 So. 2d 1039,1041 (Fla. 
App. 3d Dist. 1981) (reversing trial court's grant of summary judgment for bank which failed to 
establish all of the elements of a holder in due course). Since it has failed to do so, it is not entitled 
to enforce the $9000 check against Herwit as a holder in due course. 
Bank One claims that in allowing Aristocrat to withdraw funds in the amount of the $9000 
check, it was not on notice that Herwit's check would be dishonored. Instead, Bank One claims 
that the only notice that it had was that the check would be honored. In support of this claim, 
Bank One submitted an affidavit by Deanne Freeman, Bank One's Customer Service Manager. In 
this affidavit, Freeman states that on May 30,1995, she personally contacted First Security Bank 
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to ask whether Herwit's check had cleared. Freeman Affidavit, para 5 Freeman also states that 
1 it'st SiYiinh UTbalh ittlvtsi J lin ih.il \\w rhtvL had lk.vii lioiiunjj, iintl Ih;il sin1 hail l lhiiiore 
allowed Aristocrat to withdraw funds in the amount of the check. Freeman Affidavit, para. 5. 
The affida\ its presented by Herwit below directly dispute this claim. Herwit's personal 
affidavit states, "The affidavit of Deanne Freeman is incorrect. She indicated that defendant's 
check was honored by defendant's bank. The check has never been honored and plaintiff *was 
notice from defendant's bank that the check would not be honored." Herwit Affidavit, para. 7 
(emphasis added). 
Francee Jolley, the Operations Manager of the Park City branch of First Security Bank, 
also submitted an affidavit disputing the claim by Bank One that First Security had honored 
Herwit's check. In her affidavit, Jolley states 
Security would honor the foregoing check. In fact, the check was not honored nor has i . vv • IKV . 
hotioic'l " in|ie> AHvtovM |MU '• hi Mi' ncxl |uiiMM;iph |iiH> \ .ukl* " \^ operations manager, I 
would be aware as to whether anyone in our office would have either honored the check or stated 
to an.) pai t> that the check was hoiiored, I have discussed the matter with the Branch Manager. It 
is against bank policy to honor a check received the way Mr. Herwit's was received. Neither the 
Branch Manager nor me ever honored the foregoing check nor did we state to anyone that the 
check would be honored. In fact, the check was dishonored on Mav 
day to Bank One." Jolley Affidavit, para. 7. 
Taken topethn (licsc jiffiiiiviK »,\\A\\\ laist" *i |vinuih' r. .inn ol iruit/na] l.icl A*< IM whether 
Bank One was on notice that Herwit's check would not be honored. As a result, the circuit court's 
entry of summary judgment in this case appears to have been improvidently granted. However, 
there is another reason why this Court should reverse the circuit court's decision. Not only is there 
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Bank One was on notice that Herwit's check would 
not be honored, but there is also a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Bank One's actions 
meet the test of "good faith." 
Good faith is defined in § 70A-3-103 of the Utah Code. Section 70A-3-103 provides: " 
'Good faith' means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair 
dealing." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-103 (Supp. 1995). Comment 4 to section 3-103 of the UCC, 
upon which the Utah statute is based, provides clarification. It states, "[ajlthough fair dealing is a 
broad term that must be defined in context, it is clear that it is concerned with the fairness of 
conduct rather than the care with which an act is performed." UCC § 3-103 cmt. 4. 
On two separate occasions in handling Herwit's check, Bank One failed to follow the 
prescribed commercial practices which, had they been followed, would have prevented the loss in 
this case. The first instance occurred on May 30, 1995, when Bank One, instead of waiting for 
Herwit's check to clear, permitted Aristocrat to make a withdrawal in the amount of the check. 
That very same day, First Security determined that the check would not clear, and returned it due 
to insufficient funds. Had Bank One properly waited for the check to clear, as the normal 
commercial practice clearly calls for, Bank One could have protected itself by not giving value on 
the check. 
The second instance occurred when Bank One continued to credit Aristocrat's account in 
the amount of the check after learning that the check had been returned due to insufficient funds. 
The prescribed commercial practice in this instance would have been to immediately debit 
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Aristocrat's account. Instead, Bank One waited around for two months maintaining the 
uim.m.mlal hope lh;il llir «-1 <»•. 111 f» on 1 loiwifs rondo would )?o through. The closing has never 
gone through, and Aristocrat has since filed for bankruptcy. Had Bank One observed the normal 
practice of immediately debiting Aristocra I s «u « oiinl, li<ml. ' >iu . nuM luu pit/vailcd flic loss in 
this case. Since Bank One was in the best position to prevent the loss, there is a real question from 
a policy vantage point as to whether it ought to properly fall within the protected status of a holder 
in due course. See White & Summers § 14-2, at 615 (stating that a holder who learns of a defense 
before giving value will never come within the status of a holder in due course). 
Tk:iv is also a mil question us io wluMlici Miink ()nc\ handling of Herwit's check meets 
the test of good faith. Although no Utah cases appear to be on point, Seinfeld v. Commercial 
Bank & Trust Co., 405 Si >. 2d 1039 (F 
appears to be on all fours with the instant action. In Seinfeld, the payee of three personal checks 
went ahead and deposited the checks after reneging on a promise to the drawer that the checks 
would not be negotiated. The depository bank paid on the checks, and then continued to credit the 
payee's account after the checks were returned for insufficient funds. The bank subsequently sued 
ilu iliii'Yf 1 hi mini i ha io niiiictuliiip ili.ii HI \VA . eimllod in otifoiu' than as a holder in due course. 
The trial court granted the bank's motion for summary judgment, but the Florida District Court of 
Appeals ievcisc.il In .iddicssnifj wkliici the lutii« luid mol lis buoieii oil provitij* thai il liii<l iwWd 
in good faith, the court stated: 
While we might agree with the bank that, standing alone, neither its 
indulgence of a chronically overdrawn depositor nor its failure to 
observe the normal commercial practices of waiting for the checks 
to clear and determining the balance in Seinfeld's account before 
paying on them might not have been sufficient evidence of "bad 
faith," the coexistence of all of these factors raises at least a 
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reasonable inference that the bank acted as precipitately and 
"foolishly" as it did in order to attempt to shift to Seinfeld its own 
probable loss from Wolfson's machinations - an intent and 
motivation which demonstrate the antithesis of good faith. 
Id- at 1042. Similarly, Bank One's failure in the instant case to twice follow the prescribed 
commercial practices for handling Herwif s check also seems to "demonstrate the antithesis of 
good faith." As the court concluded in Seinfeld, "playing dumb is not the same as being dumb. A 
mere protestation of one's own innocence is not enough conclusively to demonstrate that this is 
really true when the trier of fact could find... that something more than simplemindedness lay 
behind the conduct in question." Id. 
Thus, at least two genuine issues of material fact exist which prevent the summary 
disposition of this case. The first issue deals with whether Bank One was on notice that Herwit's 
check would not be honored when the check was deposited and when Aristocrat attempted to 
make a withdrawal in the amount of the check. The second issue concerns whether Bank One 
acted in good faith in handling Herwif s check. Because these issues remain unresolved, Bank 
One cannot properly qualify as a holder in due course. Therefore, the summary disposition of 
this case is inappropriate, and this Court should reverse the circuit court's decision. 
E. BANK ONE IS NOT ENTITLED TO ENFORCE THE $9000 CHECK 
AGAINST HERWIT AS A MERE HOLDER OF THE INSTRUMENT 
Bank One contends that whether or not it properly qualifies as a holder in due course in the 
instant case is irrelevant, since it claims that even if it were just a holder, it would still be entitled to 
enforce the $9000 check against Herwit. However, the substantive rights of a holder who is not 
also holder in due course are greatly restricted. A holder who is not also a holder in due course 
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takes an instrument subject to: (a) all valid claims to it on the part of any person; (b) all defenses of 
niih p:nl\ vviiiirli would be \\\ iiilnhle in ..in . i ihon mi <i sinipK1 I'oiilKitl, ft ) llir do lenses nil >\.MII or 
failure of consideration, nonperformance of any condition precedent, non-delivery, or delivery for 
a special purpose; and, (d) the defenses of theft or breach of a restrictive indorsement. See White 
and Summers § 14-10, at 642; Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-3-305, -306 (Supp. 1995). Bank One 
contends that Herwit failed to present any of these defenses below Thus, Bank One contends that 
even if it does not qualify as a holder in due coi irse it is still ent itled to e nforce the $9000 check 
against Herwit as a mere holder of the instrument. 
Herwit has raised several valid defenses negating Bank One's right to enforce the check against 
him as a plain vanilla holder of the instrument. Herwit's own personal affidavit filed in opposition 
to Bank One's motion for summary judgment is illustrative. In this affidavit, Herwit states that he 
wrote the $9000 check to Aristocrat Travel in order to purchase ownership in the company. 
Aristocrat that the check would not clear until he obtained final approval of a loan he was seeking. 
JIITVUI Alhdaul fMiui '' lit liiillici sidles lluil Anslot ta i jji'ieoil In Imhl mi In l!n; t l ink unlil I he 
loan was secured, and that Aristocrat breached this agreement. Herwit Affidavit, paras. 3 and 4. 
Accordingly, Herwit has articulated several possible defenses negating Bank One's right to enforce 
the check against him as a mere holder of the instrument, including violation of delivery for a 
special purpose, breach of an oral agreement to hold on to the check, and failure of consideration 
(i.e., the loan never w ent through, Aristocrat has • • bankrupt, and Hei w it has ne\ er received 
anything of value for his money). 
Although these defenses are primarily asserted against Aristocrat and not Bank One, this 
fact is irrelevant. As White & Summers point out, the rights of a transferee (Bank One) to enforce 
an instrument are generally no stronger than the rights of the transferor (Aristocrat). White & 
Summers §14-6, at 52 (Supp. 1993). Hence, as a mere holder of the instrument, Bank One is 
subject to the same defenses which Herwit could raise against Aristocrat. Since Herwit has raised 
several valid defenses against Aristocrat, and thus, Bank One as well, appellee is not entitled to 
enforce the $9000 check against Herwit as a mere holder of the instrument. Therefore, this Court 
should reverse the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Bank One. 
IE. BANK ONE IS NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW 
Not only has Bank One failed to establish the nonexistence of any genuine issues of 
material fact in this case, but Bank One has also failed to establish that it is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. In fact, it appears that Bank One cannot carry this burden, because the law seems 
to be squarely on Herwit's side. 
First, the possibility that Bank One was on notice that Herwit's check would be dishonored 
precludes any chance for Bank One to qualify as a holder in due course. As stated in White & 
Summers, 
[i]f the holder of the instrument learns of a defense before he has 
given value, there will never be a single instant in which the holder 
meets all of the conditions of 3-304. Such a holder does not 
become a holder in due course. Because he had not given value 
when he received notice, he does not fall within the policy of the 
statute. Upon receiving notice of the defense the holder can protect 
himself and insure that he does not give value (as by freezing the 
account and barring the depositor from withdrawing the funds 
represented by the check). 
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White & Summers § 14-2, at 615. 
Second, the holding in Seinfeld also demonstrates that Bank One is not entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. In that case, the court on almost identical facts reversed the trial 
court's entry of summary judgment in favor of a bank which sought to enforce a check against the 
drawer as a holder in due course. Seinfeld, 405 So. 2d at 1041. The court stated, "[s]urely, the 
'circumstances of the holder's taking the checks were (not) free of all doubt' so as to permit the 
summary disposition rendered below." Id at 1042. The same reasoning would seem to apply in 
this case. 
Accordingly, absent a finding by the trier of fact that Bank One gave value on Herwit's 
check without having notice that the check would be dishonored, and absent a finding that Bank 
One's actions meet the test of "good faith," Bank One is not entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law as a holder in due course. Nor is Bank One entitled to judgment as a matter of law as a mere 
holder of the instrument. As a plain vanilla holder of the $9000 check, Bank One is subject to the 
same defenses which Herwit could raise against Aristocrat. Herwit has raised several valid 
defenses negating Bank One's right to enforce the check. Consequently, Bank One is also not 
entitled to enforce the $9000 check against Herwit as a plain vanilla holder of the instrument. This 
Court should therefore reverse the circuit court's entry of summary judgment in Bank One's favor. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, appellant respectfully asks this Court to reverse the decision of the 
circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Bank One. Summary judgment is 
inappropriate in this case because when the facts are construed in the light most favorable to 
16 
appellant's position, it is clear that Bank One has failed to conclusively demonstrate the 
nonexistence of any genuine issues of material fact. Moreover, summary judgment is also 
inappropriate because Bank One is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, this 
Court should reverse the circuit court's decision and remand the case for trial. 
DATED this 29th day of December, 1995. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Grant W. P. Morrison, Attorney for Appellant 
Paul Herwit 
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Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment having been submitted 
to the Court pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration, and Plaintiff and Defendant being represented by 
counsel and the Honorable Judge Michael L. Hutchings, one of the 
judges of the above-entitled court, having reviewed Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and having entered a decision thereon 
(Minute Entry of September 19, 1995), and the court being fully 
advised in the premises, and upon motion of Richer, Swan & 
Overholt, P.C, attorneys for Plaintiff, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Civil No. 950009179 CV 
Judge Michael L. Hutchings 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby 
granted. 
2. Plaintiff is awarded Judgment as against Defendant Paul 
Herwit in the amount of $9,000.00 as of May 19, 1995, plus interest 
at the statutory rate of 9.22% per annum thereafter until paid in 
full. 
3. Plaintiff is further awarded Judgment as against 
Defendant Paul Herwit in the sum of $92.00 representing costs 
incurred herein. 
4. It is further ordered that this Judgment shall be 
augmented in the amount of costs expended in collecting said 
Judgment by execution or otherwise. 
DATED this day of September, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
MICHAEL L. HUTCHINGS 
Third Circuit Court Judge 
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I hereby certify that on the of September, 1995, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon 
the following parties by placing the same in the United States 
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H. Delbert Welker 
Attorney for Defendant 
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PAUL HERWIT, Civil No. 95000S179 CV 
Defendant. Judge Hutchings 
ooOoo 
Plaintiff, Bank One, Utah, by and through the law firm of 
Richer, Swan & Overholt, P.C, hereby moves this Court pursuant to 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for the entry of summary 
judgment against Defendant Paul Herwit. This Motion is supported 
by the Affidavit of Deanne Freeman, filed contemporaneously 
herewith and a Memorandum setting forth the undisputed facts and 
applicable points of law. 
Pursuant thereto, Plaintiff believes that there are sufficient 
grounds for this Court to enter a summary judgment against the 
Defendant Paul Herwit on the basis that no material issues of fact 
Civil No. 950009179 
Judge Hutchings 
exist and that Plaintiff is entitled, as a matter of law, to 
judgment against Defendant Paul Herwit in the amount of $9,000.00 
as of May 19, 1995, plus interest thereafter at the highest legal 
rate per annum until paid in full and costs of court. 
DATED this ^ 3 day of August, 1995. 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
M^rk £. Mescalf 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the J) / day of August, 1995, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon 
the following parties by placing the same in the United States 
mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
H. Delbert Welker 
Attorney for Defendant 
3540 South 4000 West, #430 
West Valley City, UT 84120 
ban24650.doc 
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Plaintiff, Bank One, Utah, by and through the law firm of 
Richer, Swan & Overholt, P.C, hereby submits uhe following 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. This Memorandum is supported by the 
Affidavit of Deanne Freeman filed contemporaneously herewith. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. On May 19, 1995 Defendant executed Check Nc. 2526 drawn 
on his account at First Security Bank in the amount of $9,000.00 
(See, Plaintiff's Complaint at paragraph 5 and Defendant's 
admission in response thereto. See also, a copy of Check No. 2526, 
Civil No. 950009179 
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attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this 
reference). 
2. Check No. 2526 was made payable to the order of 
Aristocrat Travel and Cruises of Park City, Inc. (hereinafter 
"Payee"). (See, Plaintiff's Complaint at paragraph 6 and 
Defendant's admission in response thereto). 
3. On or aboat May IS, 1995 Check No. 2526 was presented to 
Plaintiff for payment by the Payee. (See, Plaintiff's Complaint at 
paragraph 7 and Defendant's admission in response thereto). 
4. On May 19, 1995 the Payee deposited Check No. 2526 to its 
checking account, No. 13477545, at Bank One, Utah. (See, 
Plaintiff's Complaint at paragraph 7 and Defendant's admission in 
response thereto and Affidavit of Deanne Freeman at paragraph 4). 1 
5. Following deposit by the Payee of Check No. 2526 
Plaintiff credited Payee's account, No. 13477545, in the amount of 
$9,000.00. (See, Affidavit of Deanne Freeman at paragraph 5). 
6. Subsequent to receiving credit for Check No. 2526 the 
Payee withdrew from its account the funds so credited. (See, 
Affidavit of Deanne Freeman at paragraph 6). v 
1Plaintiff's Complaint alleges deposit of Check No. 2526. 
This is undenied by the Defendant and therefore admitted pursuant 
to Rule 8(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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7. Subsequent to receipt of Check No. 2526 Plaintiff 
presented the same for payment to First Security Bank, the drawee 
thereon. (See, Affidavit of Deanne Freeman at paragraph 7). 
8. The drawee refused to honor Check No. 2 52 6 by reason of 
insufficient funds and returned the same to Plaintiff bearing the 
notation "RTM" (refer to maker) . (See, Affidavit of Deanne Freeman 
at paragraph 7 and Exhibit "A"). -
9. Check No. 2526 does not bear any evidence cf forgery or 
alteration, apparent or otherwise, and is regular and complete on 
its face. (See, Exhibit "A"). 
10. Plaintiff, prior to taking Check No. 2526, was never 
provided notice of any defect in the instrument, default in the 
instrument or any defense or claim to it by any party. (See, 
Affidavit of Deanne Freeman at paragraph 8). 
11. Plaintiff remains in possession of Check No. 2526. (See, 
Affidavit of Deanne Freeman at paragraph 9). The original Check 
No. 2526 is presently in the possession of Plaintiff's counsel and 
is available for inspection by the parties and/or the Court. 
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ARGUMENT 
PLAINTIFF, AS HOLDER AND HOLDER IN DUE COURSE 
OF CHECK NO. 2 526, IS ENTITLED TO ENFORCE THE 
SAME AGAINST THE SIGNER THEREOF 
Defendant wrote a check for which his account did not contain 
sufficient funds. The check was drawn on First Security Bank. The 
Payee deposited the check in its account at Bank One, Utah. Bank 
One credited the account of the Payee and permitted the Payee to 
withdraw the sums so credited. Defendant's check was dishonored by 
First Security Bank upon presentment. Pursuant to negotiable 
instruments law, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for the face 
amount of Check No. 2526. 
Defendant admits that he is the drawer of Check No. 2 526. 
Under Utah law if a draft is dishonored2 the drawer is obliged to 
pay the draft according to its terms. Subsection 70A-3-414(2), 
Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
The drawer's liability may be enforced by any holder. 
Subsection 70A-3-301, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). A holder 
in due course (hereinafter "HDC") is a species of holder. 
Subsection 70A-3-302(1), Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
2A check is a species of draft. Subsection 70A-3-104(6), Utah 
Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
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Therefore, Plaintiff is an HDC of Check No. 2526 and therefore 
takes the instrument free of any ordinary contract defenses which 
the drawer may claim. Subsection 70A-3-305(2), Utah Code Ann. 
(1953 as amended). 
The law establishes two criteria for determining whether or 
not a holder is in fact an HDC. A holder receives the status of 
HDC with regard to an instrument if: 
[T]he instrument when issued or negotiated to 
the holder does not bear such apparent 
evidence of forgery or alternation or is not 
otherwise so irregular or incomplete as to 
call into question its authenticity; 
Subsection 70A-3-302(1)(a) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
The instrument in question has been submitted to the Court. 
It bears no evidence of forgery or alteration whatsoever, much less 
any apparent evidence of forgery or alteration. On the contrary, 
there has been no claim made by the Defendant of forgery, lack of 
authenticity or of any irregularity in the face of the instrument. 
The second requirement is that the holder takes the instrument 
for value in good faith and without notice of any defects in the 
instrument. Subsection 70A-3-302 (b) , Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended). 
Plaintiff meets all of these requirements. Value is defined 
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at Subsection 70A-3-303(l) (b) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) . A 
holder has given value for an instrument when he acquires a 
security interest in it. Whether a party acquires a security 
interest in an instrument is controlled by Subsection 70A-4-210(l) 
Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) which reads as follows: 
A collecting bank has a security interest in 
an item and any accompanying documents or 
other proceeds of either: 
(a) in case of an item deposited in an 
account, to the extent to which credit given 
for the item has been withdrawn or applied; 
It is undisputed that this instrument was deposited to the account 
of the Payee. The account was credited and the credit withdrawn. 
Finally an HDC must take the instrument in good faith and 
without notice of certain enumerated defects. Again, no issue has 
been raised in this regard. The Affidavit of Deanne Freeman 
establishes that Plaintiff took the instrument in question without 
notice of any defects thereto. In fact, Plaintiff was verbally 
assured by the drawee, First Security Bank, that there were 
sufficient funds to cover the check and that it would be honored. 
It is the Defendant's contention, as stated in his Answer, 
that at the time he delivered the instrument to its Payee the Payee 
had knowledge that the check was drawn on insufficient funds and 
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that the Payee was not authorized to deposit the check. However, 
the knowledge of the Payee cannot be charged to Plaintiff. This is 
>•••• 
specifically__the kind of defense which is unavailable against an 
HDC. This is made clear by the official comments to the Uniform 
Commercial Code which expressly state that the "defenses" which are 
unavailable to a drawee include the defense of "conditional 
delivery or delivery for a special purpose." (See , Official 
Comments at paragraph 3). 
The only notice which the Defendant alleges was given to 
Plaintiff was notice "that the check would not clear" (Defendant's 
answer at paragraph 5). This allegation is of course disputed by 
Plaintiff. Plaintiff is not in the practice of honoring checks 
presented to it when simultaneously informed that the check is 
drawn on insufficient funds. However, even if the allegation were 
true it would not deprive Plaintiff of HDC status. 
Subsection 70A-3-302 specifically enumerates those classes of 
notice which would deprive a holder of HDC status. Those specific 
types of notice are as follows: (1) that the instrument is overdue; 
(2) that the instrument has been dish^nrf^; (3) That there is an 
uncured default with respect to payment of another instrument 
issued as part of the same series; (4) notice that the instrument 
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contains an unauthorized signature or has been altered; (5) notice 
of a claim to the instrument described in § 70A-3-306 (claims not 
relevant herein); and (6) notice that any party has a defense or 
claim in recoupment described in § 70A-3-305(l) (claims and 
defenses not applicable herein) . 
Thus, Plaintiff is, as a matter of law, an HDC entitled to 
enforce the instrument. 
EVEN AS A HOLDER PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT. 
The most fundamental flaw in the Defendant ! s denial of 
liability is that, even if Plaintiff is not an HDC, Plaintiff is 
still entitled to recovery on the instrument. The fact that the 
check was drawn on insufficient funds does not relieve Defendant of 
his liability on the instrument. 
As noted earlier, in the event of dishonor, a drawer is 
obligated to pay a draft according to its terms. (Subsection 70A-
3-414, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended)). As stated earlier, the 
drawer's obligation is to pay the holder. (Subsection 70A-3-301, 
Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) ) . It is undisputed that Plaintiff 
is thus holder. The instrument is in Plaintiff's possession and 
available for inspection. The only issue which remains is whether 
the instrument has been dishonored. 
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Dishonor is defined at Subsection 70A-3-502 Utah Code Ann. 
(1953 as amended) as follows: 
If a draft is payable on demand and subsection 
(a) does not apply the draft is dishonored if 
presentment for payment is duly made to the 
drawee and the draft is not paid on the day of 
presentment. 
Presentment is defined at Subsection 7QA-3-501, Utah Code Ann. 
(19 53 as amended) as follows: 
"Presentment" means a demand made by or on 
behalf of a person entitled zo enforce an 
instrument to pay the instrument made to the 
drawee or a party obliged to pay the 
instrument or, in the case of a note or 
accepted draft payable at a bank, to the bank, 
or to accept a draft made to the drawee. 
It is undisputed that Plaintiff is the holder. The instrument in 
question was presented to the drawee, First Security Bank, and was 
not paid upon presentment. On the contrary, it was returned due to 
insufficient funds and marked "Return to Maker". 
The check before this Court is, itself, a species of contract. 
Rocky Mountain Claim Staking v. Frandsen, 2 51 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 2 
(Utah App. 1994) . The check is clear, complete and unambiguous on 
its face. 
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When the existence of a contract and the 
identity of its parties are not in issue and 
when the contract provisions are clear and 
complete the meaning of the contract can 
appropriately be resolved by the court on 
summary judgment. 
Morris v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 658 P.2d 1199, 1201 
(Utah 1983). 
It is equally clear that the Defendant has not fulfilled his 
duty to pay the face amount of the check to the holder. The 
Defendant's position that the fact that the check was drawn on 
insufficient funds somehow relieves him of liability is absurd. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests Judgment in the 
amount of $9,000.00 as of May 19, 1995 plus interest thereafter at 
the highest legal rate per annum until paid in full and costs of 
court. 
CONCLUSION 
It is undisputed that the Defendant executed a check which was 
paid by the Plaintiff. While the Defendant's position is somewhat 
unclear, it appears to be his position that he is free to do so, 
creating negotiable instruments and casting them upon the sea of 
commerce with no responsibility whatsoever for the fact that he has 
no ability to back the instrument so signed. This position is 
fundamentally flawed and is simply not the law of the State of 
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Utah. Plaintiff, as a matter of law, is entitled to judgment 
against the Defendant as requested. 
DATED this
 :?/ day of August, 19 95. 
RICHER, SWAN & 0VERH0LTf P.C. 
B y :/•-, ; • -A •' 
Mark E. Medcalf 
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Plaintiff, 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss . 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
I, Deanne Freeman, being first duly sworn depose and say as 
follows: 
1. I am the Customer Service Manager of the Bountiful office 
of Bank One, Utah. 
2. By virtue of my responsibilities in regard thereto I have 
access to the records of Bank One, Utah as they pertain to the 
negotiable instrument which is the subject matter of the present 
action and transactions affecting the account of the payee thereon 
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Aristocrat Travel and Cruises of Park City, Inc. 
3. Records produced herewith are maintained in the ordinary 
course of business of Bank One, Utah. 
4. On May 25, 1995 check number 2526 drawn on the account of 
Paul Herwit at First Security Bank was deposited to the account of 
Aristocrat Travel and Cruises of Park City, Inc., account number 
13477545, at Bank One, Utah. A copy of check number 2526 is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
5. On May 3 0 I contacted First Security Bank to inquire as 
zo whether check number 2526 had cleared First Security Bank. I 
was advised on May 30, 1995 that the check had been honored, and I 
credited the payee's account accordingly. 
6. After receiving credit for check number 2526 the payee 
withdrew from its account the funds so credited. Copies of 
relevant monthly statements are attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
7. On or about May 31, 1995 First Security Bank refused to 
accept check number 2526 and refused to remit payment thereon. The 
instrument was returned due to insufficient funds and bearing the 
notation "RTM" (refer to maker). 
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8. Paul Herwit is not a client of Bank One, Utah. Prior to 
honoring his check Bank One, Utah received no communication or 
notice from Paul Herwit regarding check number 2526. 
9. Bank One, Utah is currently in possession of check number 
2526. 
Further affiant sayeth not. 
DATED this Q^l^day of August, 1995. 
LJ^lAMr^la^ 
Deanne Freeman 
t SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ^¥ day of 




Residing in JST<-C<:^ 
My Commission Expires: „, 
I 
I V I I H ^ / tali of Utah i 
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PAUL HERWIT, : 
Defendant. : 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL HERWIT 
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 950009179 
Judge: Hutchings 
PAUL HERWIT, having been duly sworn, hereby deposes and 
states the following: 
1. The affiant is the defendant in the above matter. 
2. On or about M&y 19, 1995, affiant wrote a check to 
his employer, Aristocrat Travel in the amount of $9,000.00 to 
purchase ownership in the company. 
3. When affiant delivered the check to his employer, he 
informed his employer that the check would not clear until he 
received final approval of the loan he was seeking. His employer 
agreed to hold the check until the loan was secured. 
4. On or about May 26, 1995, defendant's employer, 
inadvertantly and without defendant's knowledge and authorization, 
deposited the check in its business account at Bank One. 
5. Shortly thereafter, defendant received many telephone 
calls from Gary Finnegan, Manager of Bank One in Bountiful, Mr. 
Finnegan called defendant for a period of two months and called 
defendant in his home and at his office. 
6. Mr. Finnegan's purpose for calling was to verify when 
defendant would receive the loan and make the check good. From the 
date plaintiff received defendant's check to the present, plaintiff 
knew that the check would not clear defendant's bank. 
7. The affidavit of Deanne Freeman is incorrect. She 
indicated that defendant's check was honored by defendant's bank. 
The check has never been honored and plaintiff was given notice 
many times by defendant that the check would not be honored and 
plaintiff also had notice from defendant's bank that the check 
waould not be honored. 
Dated this _f_ day of t$^^JMJ , 1995. 
PAUL HERWIT 
^ V ( ^ / / ^ 
Jt£ 
i Subscribed and Sworn to before me this Q day of 
'JhJUl^AA 1/£/?, 1995. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
IUJEAN YATO ^ 
1514 Park Ave. P.p. Box 1660 
Park City, Utah 84060 
COMM&ION EXPIRES 
NOV. 20. 1995 
S1ATEOFU1AH 
ry/7Public 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Affidavit of Paul Herwit to Arnold Richer, Esq. RICHER, SWAN & 
OVERHOLT, 311 South Stats<-S*seey/ #280, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
on thls^/ day of \^>&n^£^ , 1995. 
H. Delbert WelJcer (3418) 
3540 South 4000 West, #430 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Telephone: 963-0555 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
BANK ONE, UTAH, National 
Association, fka VALLEY BANK 






AFFIDAVIT OF FRANCEE JOLLEY 
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 950009179 
Judge: Hutchings 
FRANCEE JOLLEY, having been duly sworn, hereby deposes 
and states the following: 
1. The affiant is the Operations Manager of the Park 
City, branch of First Security Bank. 
2. The affiant has personal knowledge of the following 
events. 
3. On May 26, 1995, Friday afternoon. Memorial Day Week-
end, the Park City, branch of First Security Bank received a check 
on the account of Paul Herwit, #2526 in the amount of $9,000.00. 
4. Mr, Herwit's account did not have sufficient funds to 
cover the check. 
5. On Tuesday M&y 30, 1995, the day after the holiday, 
Mr. Herwit's account did not have sufficient funds to cover the 
check and the check was returned to Bank One on that day. To my 
knowledge, check #2526 has never been paid by First Security Bank. 
Dated this/Z^ay of ^£^^J>^ , , 1995. 
ubscribed and Sworn to bef 
, 1995. 
this Jj_ day of 
NOTARY PUBIC 
JUDITH A. FUTMAN 




STATE OF UTAH 
ary Public 
CERTIFICATE OP MAILING 
u/fcfA ^ ) T £ ^ ^ 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Affidavit of Prancee Jolley to Arnold Richer, Esq. RICHER, SWAN & 
OVERHOLT, 311 South Stj^~SETOt^#280, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
on this // day of C><^L^frL^ 1995 
Arnold Richer - 2751 
Mark E. Medcalf -5404 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
311 South State Street, Suite 280 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 539-8632 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Bank One, Utah, N.A. 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
-ooOoo-
BANK ONE, UTAH, National 
Association, fka VALLEY BANK 






PLAINTIFF • S REPLY MEMORANDUM 
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 
SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 950009179 CV 
Judge Hutchings 
-ooOoo-
Plaintiff, Bank One, Utah, N.A. by and through the law firm 
of Richer, Swan & Overholt, P.C. hereby submits the following Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
This Reply Memorandum is being submitted in reply to those items 
raised in the Affidavits of Paul Herwit and Francee Jolley filed in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
00011577.E95 
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POINT I 
THE ALLEGATION OF THE DEFENDANT'S OPPOSING AFFIDAVITS 
ARE IRRELEVANT TO THE ENFORCEABILITY 
OF THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT IN QUESTION 
Plaintiff is attempting to enforce the Defendant's maker 
liability on check number 2526. Plaintiff has argued in its 
original Memorandum that Plaintiff has a status of both a holder 
and a holder in due course (hereinafter "HDC") of this check. The 
distinction, with regard to enforcement of instruments, between a 
holder and an HDC is set forth in § 70A-3-305. An HDC can enforce 
an instrument free of the maker's contract defenses to that 
instrument. A holder may also enforce an instrument, but subject 
to a maker's ordinary contract defenses. 
If the maker raises no defenses to the enforceability of the 
instrument, the holder's status as either a holder or an HDC is 
irrelevant. 
This is specifically the situation before this court. 
Through the Affidavits filed in opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendant attempts to raise issues 
regarding notice which Plaintiff may or may not have had at the 
time check number 2526 was negotiated. Plaintiff does not concede 
that it had any kind of notice at the time it accepted check number 
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2526. However, it is irrelevant. Notice is only relevant because 
in order to receive the status of an HDC, a holder must take a 
check without notice of the following defects. 
(1) That the instrument is overdue; 
(2) That the instrument has been dishonored; 
(3) That there is an uncured default with respect 
to payment of another instrument issued as 
part of the same series; 
(4) That the instrument contains an unauthorized 
signature or has been altered; 
(5) Without notice of any claim to the instrument 
described in § 70A-3-306; and, 
(6) Without notice that any party has a defense or 
claim in recoupment described in §70A-3-
305(1). 
§ 70A-3-302(l)(b), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
If the Defendant's affidavits raise an issue with regard to 
notice, this would reduce Plaintiff's position from that of an HDC 
to that of a holder. The holder has the right to enforce the check 
subject to defenses. However, the Defendant has raised none, 
either by answer or through a memorandum in opposition to summary 
judgment. Therefore, the Defendant's allegations are irrelevant 
and Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment. 
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POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVITS DO NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF 
FACT AS TO "NOTICE" WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE PLAINTIFF 
FROM HAVING THE STATUS OF AN HDC 
As set forth in Plaintiff's original Memorandum, there are 
three requirements for HDC status. First, the instrument in 
question must bear no apparent evidence of forgery or alteration. 
The second requirement is that the holder take the instrument for 
value. Neither of these elements are challenged by the Defendant. 
The third requirement is that the holder take the instrument in 
good faith without notice of the defects described above. § 70A-3-
302(1)(a) and (b). 
The Defendant has not alleged that Plaintiff had notice of any 
of those items set forth in § 70A-3-302(b). The Defendant only 
alleges that Plaintiff had notice of insufficiency of funds in the 
maker's account. The Defendant's contention that this suffices to 
defeat HDC status leads to an impossible conclusion. If notice of 
insufficiency of funds, obtained when a holder presents a check for 
collection only to have it dishonored, precludes one from having 
HDC status, no party would ever have HDC status to collect a bad 
check since one is only attempting to enforce instruments which 
have been dishonored. Finally, the Defendant has not even raised 
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an issue with regard to Plaintiff's notice at the time the check 
was negotiated. 
It is essential to keep in mind the precise language of § 70A-
3-302, which begins with the following language: "the holder took 
the i nstn imei i I: . . *i :i thout i n :>tlce. . . " If t:l: le i: equir ement is 
that a holder take an instrument without notice, the only notice 
which would be relevant is notice the holder had at the time it 
By the Defendant's own admission (Affidavit of Paul Herwit at 
Paragraph 4) the check was deposited at Bank One on May 26, 1995. 
The Defendant goes on to allege in Paragraph 5 of his Affidavit 
that it was only thereafter, and for a period of two months 
thereafter that an officer of Bank One contacted him request iiiq 
that he make his check good, There is nothing in the Affidavit of 
Mr. Herwit to suggest that the Bank had notice of the insufficiency 
of funds in the Defendant's account prioi " > taking the i nstrument. 
This is of course natural since the maker of an instrument could 
not reasonably communicate with the third party to whom it is 
negotiated since he (Ines niini have any knowledge of the i ienti try mi 
the third party to whom his payee may negotiate the check. The 
Affidavit of Deeann Freeman filed in support of Plaintiff's Motion 
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for Summary Judgment states that, prior to taking check number 
2526, Plaintiff had no notice of any kind from Defendant Herwit. 
This allegation is un-rebutted. 
Finally, the Defendant alleges in Paragraph 3 of his Affidavit 
that the payee, Aristocrat Travel, had notice that the check was 
drawn on insufficient funds. Initially, it should be noted that 
this notice cannot be imputed to Plaintiff. Secondly, it should be 
noted that this is specifically the kind of situation from which 
the Uniform Commercial Code attempts to protect an HDC. 
Since the amendment of the negotiable instruments section of 
the Uniform Commercial Code in 1993, there have been no Utah cases 
clarifying the purpose or intent of statutes concerning HDC status. 
However, the purpose of the Rule is made clear by the official 
comments thereto. 
If buyer issues an instrument to seller and buyer 
has a defense against seller, that defense can 
obviously be asserted. Buyer and seller are the 
only people involved. The holder-in-due-course 
doctrine has no relevance. The doctrine applies 
only in cases in which more than two parties are 
involved. Its essence is that the holder-in-due-
course does not have to suffer the consequences of 
a defense of the obligor on the instrument that 
arose from an occurrence with a third party. 
(Commercial and Debtor/Creditor Law, selected 
statutes 1995 edition, Foundation Press, §3-305 
Page 333, Comment 2.) 
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Thus, the Defendant's transactions and communications with the 
payee of the I nstrument are irro 1 ewtni . If the Defendanll lias 
claims against that party, he is free to raise them. However, they 
cannot be raised against an HDC. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff is an HDC of this instrument. The Defendant's 
allegations of notice given to Plaintiff, after Plaintiff 
negotiated the i nstr ument in question, are irrelevant 
notice which Plaintiff may have had at the time took the 
instrument, which would have any bearing on Plaintiff's status as 
an HDC, As an HDC, Plaintiff can enforce the instrument free of 
any defenses the Defendant may have thereto. However, even if 
Plaintiff is merely a holder, Plaintiff is still entitled to 
enforce the instrument and is entitled to summary judgment since 
the Defendant has raised no defenses to the instrument. Apparently 
the Defendant knew he was writing a check 01 :it i nsufficient fi inds. 
This does not give rise to a defense to the instrument. If it did, 
no instrument, drawn on insufficient funds, would ever be 
enforceable. 
Defendant also alleges that his original payee had notice of 
this fact prior to the time Plaintiff took the instrument. Notice 
00011577.E95 7 
Civil No. 950009179 CV 
Judge Michael L Hutchings 
to the original payee is not notice to Plaintiff, and therefore, it 
has no bearing on Plaintiff's right to enforce the instrument. 
Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment as requested in 
Plaintiff's original motion. 
DATED this /y day of September, 1995. 
RICHER/ SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
B y ; J a ^ ^ ^ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /y day of 
September, 1995, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
to be served upon the following by placing the same in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid, and addressed as follows: 
H. Delbert Welker 
Attorney for Defendant 
3540 South 4000 West, #430 
West Valley City, UT 84120 
^Uf//^/Wt/^ 
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